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CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT:
THE TORT AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The monopoly granted to a patentee by virtue of the Patent Law
appears to be inconsistent with the antimonopoly objectives of the
Antitrust Laws. Pursuant to constitutional authorization, Congress
has granted the inventor a monopoly of limited duration in his inven-
tion. This monopoly is justified, according to the Constitution,
in order "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."2
Public interest is served by granting a monopoly in one case and with-
holding it in the other.
As might be expected cases arise in which antitrust and patent
laws conflict. Resolution of such conflict requires a delicate balancing
of interests; that of encouraging invention against that of encourag-
ing competition. This note deals with cases in which the patent law
conflicts with section three of the Clayton Act.3 More particularly, it
will examine the effect of section 3 on the law of contributory in-
fringement.
A. THE PATENT GRANT; REMEDY OF INJUNCTION
FOR CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
The Patent Act provides that a patent can be obtained for a new,
original and useful, machine, manufacture, composition of matter and
process.4 Having obtained a patent for a period of seventeen years,
the patentee has the exclusive right to make, use, and sell his inven-
tion, 5 and a violation of his right is tortious conduct, as defined by
section 271 of the Patent Act:
(a) [W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any
patented invention, within the United States during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manu-
facture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and
not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for sub-
1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1959).
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
4. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1959)
5. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1959)
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stantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
(d) No patent owner, otherwise entitled to relief for infringe-
ment or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied
relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would constitute con-
tributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
Subsection (a) needs no explanation at this time in that it applies
only to persons who actually make, use or sell the patented invention.
Subsections (b), (c) and (d), new in the Patent Act of 1952, require
careful attention. These subsections purport to impose liability upon
third persons who do not actually make, use or sell the entire combi-
nation constituting the patented invention. The tort of contributory
infringement, defined by these sections, is derivative-the liability
of third persons is dependent upon or derived from the liability of
the person who actually makes, uses or sells the patented invention.
The need for imposing such derivative liability is demonstrated
by the following example:
Assume that X, patentee, is the owner of a patent for the invention
consisting of the combination AB. R, a manufacturer of components
A and B sells these components with directions for building the
patented invention AB. The persons who combine these components
are clearly infringers. But, if X were limited to his remedy against
the combiner of the components, the patent would be of less value to
him, since he would be faced with the difficult, and expensive task of
seeking out and bringing suit against persons who actually combined
the components A and B. X's only effective remedy would be to enjoin
R from selling these components in this manner. An action for
contributory infringement provides such a remedy against R.
But injunction, in the situation described above, is a drastic
remedy. R is prevented from selling components A and B, which by
hypothesis are unpatented. Thus, through his patent, X is able to
prevent R from selling the unpatented goods which, in the absence of
such a patent, he could sell lawfully. This result might not seem
objectionable, were it not for the possible anticompetitive effects in
the market for components. If, by means of his patent for the com-
bination AB, X can prevent R from selling the unpatented components
in the market, while reserving the market to himself, X has achieved
a monopoly for the components in that market. For example, if X
sold the components with directions for making AB, by enjoining R
from making similar sales he has achieved a monopoly over the un-
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patented components A and B." It will be demonstrated in this note
that to permit X such a monopoly would be inconsistent with the
policies of the antitrust and patent laws; that since the patent
monopoly is granted for inventions only, it is not intended that
previously unpatented components be monopolized; and that because
of the antitrust laws, such monopoly is prevented by withholding
injunctive relief. The courts have denied this relief to those who
attempt to monopolize the unpatented components of an invention. 7
More particularly, the thesis of this note is that a patentee who sells
the unpatented components of his invention should always be denied
the remedy of injunction for contributory infringement, since a
successful suit, under these circumstances, would have the necessary
effect of extending the patentee's monopoly to the unpatented com-
ponents of the invention.
B. THE BIRTH, DEMISE AND RESURRECTION OF
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
It has been indicated that the tort of contributory infringement
was designed to provide a remedy against third persons who would
dilute the value of the patent by aiding, abetting and encouraging
infringement. While it was recognized that the patentee was entitled
to such protection, early cases were cognizant of the inherent danger
to competition.
Denying injunction in the case of Cortelyou v. Chas. E. Johnson
& Co.,, the court warned: "Care should be taken that the courts, in
their efforts to protect the rights of patentees, do not invade the just
rights of others, engaged in legitimate occupations, by creating new
monopolies not covered by patents and by placing unwarrantable
restrictions upon trade."O In the beginning it looked as though the
Supreme Court would heed this advice. Thus in the case of Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co.,'0 the court, relying on the earlier
case of Wilson v. Simpson," denied an injunction to a patentee holding
a patent for the combination of a toilet paper roll with a dispenser,
who sought to enjoin the replacement sales of toilet paper for use with
his dispenser.
6. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber
Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1916).
7. Ibid.
8. 145 Fed. 933 (2d Cir. 1906).
9. Id. at 935.
10. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
11. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
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After the Morgan Envelope case the advice in the Cortelyou v.
Johnson case went unheeded. In the case of Henry v. A. B. Dick,12
the patentee sold its patented mimeograph with a license restriction
to the effect that A. B. Dick's ink and other supplies be used exclu-
sively in connection with the mimeograph. The court granted an
injunction which prevented defendant from selling unpatented ink
to owners of A. B. Dick mimeographs. The same court, in Leeds &
Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 13 granted an in-
junction to the patentee of a combination phonograph and recording
disc, against a seller of competitive recording discs, even though these
competitive discs were capable of substantial noninfringing use',
with phonographs made by the defendant. Neither of these latter
cases considered the Sherman Act'15 applicable. The effect of these
cases was to permit extension of the patent monopoly to unpatented
goods.
To remedy the anticompetitive effect of A. B. Dick and other
decisions, Congress passed section 3 of the Clayton Act which pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for
sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States ... or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or under-
standing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."6
This act brought about the overruling of the A. B. Dick case in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,' 7 involving a
substantially similar fact situation. The Victor case, though fre-
quently distinguished,28 was not overruled for thirty-two years. 9
12. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
13. 213 U.S. 325 (1909)
14. An element of a combination is capable of substantial noninfringing use
if it is not specially designed and specially adapted for use in practicing the
invention and is not a staple article of commerce. Cf. § 271 (c) of the Patent Act.
15. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1952).
16. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
17. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
18. See, e.g., Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923).
19. In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), the
Victor case was overruled to the extent inconsistent with that opinion. It
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Heretofore the cases discussed, such as A. B. Dick and Morgan
Envelope, have dealt with situations in which the patentee sought to
tie the sale of unpatented products to patented articles, or in which
the patentee sought to prevent the sale of unpatented aricles for
replacement or repair of patented combinations. The case of Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp.20 represents a
different class. Here the patentee, a seller of dry ice, held a patent for
a combination of dry ice with a cardboard box, which was used to
ship perishable goods. The patentee did not practice the invention
itself, but licensed purchasers of its dry ice to use it. Plaintiff sought
an injunction for contributory infringement to prevent defendant
from selling dry ice to persons for use with cardboard boxes in the
manner claimed in the patent. The Court, relying on the Morgan
Envelope and Motion Pictures cases, denied the injunction on the
ground that plaintiff was attempting to monopolize unpatented dry
ice by means of his patent, which was an abuse of the patent grant.21
Similarly, in Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 22 the Court denied an
injunction to a patentee for contributory infringement of a process
patent for using certain materials in highway construction. As in the
Carbice case, the patentee did not practice the invention, but licensed
purchasers of the building material to use the process. The Court
reasoned that an action would not lie against another seller of the
construction materials because to do so would allow the patentee to
extend his patent monopoly to unpatented goods.
The case of Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 23 differed
from the Carbice case in that plaintiff sought to enjoin the sale of the
unpatented element of the combination which was specially designed
and suited for infringing the plaintiff's patent. The Court, in denying
the injunction held that this difference was unimportant, and that the
Carbice case still controlled.
The Mercoid case evoked considerable criticism, 24 and was con-
demned on three grounds: (1) that it did away with contributory
seems the case is not completely dead, however, since it was cited in Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961), discussed infra.
20. 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
21. Id. at 33-34.
22. 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
23. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
24. See, e.g., Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 250 (1955); Eastman,
Contributory Infringement and the Combination Patent, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 183
(1949) ; Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 Mich. L.
Rev. 199 (1955); Waite, Judicial Legislation-Patent Law-Has the Doctrine of
Contributory Infringement Been Repudiated?, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 915 (1944);
Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 61
(1944).
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infringement, (2) that it failed to punish persons who deliberately
attempted to induce infringement of the patent by selling components
specially designed and adapted for that purpose, and (3) that the
decision failed to distinguish between components of the invention
that were the "heart of the invention" 5 and components which were
of only minor importance.
Credence has been lent to the first criticism because of the con-
curring opinion of Justice Black, in which he declared that the tort
of contributory infringement should not be recognized. The majority
opinion also lends some support to this position. In any event, the
reference to the non-existence of contributory infringement was
obiter dictum, and properly condemned as such by Justice Frank-
furter.26
The second criticism must be discussed in light of the pre-Clayton
Act cases. At this time the Sherman Act was held inapplicable to
patent licensing agreements.2 7 Even though some of the early deci-
sions recognized the possible anticompetitive effects of injunction for
contributory infringement,28 they talked in terms of the nature of the
article sold rather than in terms of the plaintiff's conduct. The
following quotation from the Cortelyou v. Johnson case is typical:
When confined to articles . . . which are made for the express
purpose of inducing infringement and are not intended for any
legitimate use, the doctrine of contributory infringement is
logical, just and salutary... [but] . . . we incline to the opinion
that the line should be drawn to include (only) those articles
which are either parts of a patented combination or device or
which are produced for the sole purpose of being so used and to
exclude staple articles of commerce .2
The above language, and that of other cases, suggests that a suit for
contributory infringement should not be permitted to enjoin the sale
of a commodity capable of substantial noninfringing use.
The fallacy in this position is that actively inducing infringement
or specially adapting a component merely demonstrates the knowl-
edge and intent of defendant. But conceding such knowledge and
intent, if plaintiff is also guilty of inequitable conduct in extending
his monopoly, the parties are in pari delicto, and a court of equity
still should not interfere. Although the Court's reasoning is unclear,
this appears to be the basis for the decision in the Mercoid case.
The majority of the Attorney General's Committee 0 was of the
25. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944).
26. Id. at 676 (Dissenting opinion).
27. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
28. Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson & Co., 145 Fed. 933 (1906).
29. Id. at 935.
30. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., op. cit. supra note 24.
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opinion that some distinction should be made between elements which
can be characterized as the heart of the invention and those elements
which are less essential, and that the sale of the latter should be
enjoined. One of the first decisions establishing such a distinction
was the Victor case. 31 The fallacy in this distinction is, however, that
31. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S. 325
(1909), provides a vivid illustration of how "hard decisions made bad law."
The Court distinguished between the heart of the invention and nonessential
elements, in order to distinguish the Morgan Envelope case. The toilet paper in
the Morgan case was not held to be the "heart," while the disc in the Victor
case was. Furthermore, in the Morgan case there was a dispenser of toilet
paper involved and the Court in the Victor case felt that the patentee must have
intended that the buyer of a dispenser could replace the items dispensed.
The Wilson case was also distinguished because here there was no repair,
since the person who bought new discs was not repairing his unit, but merely
adding variety to his sound system. These distinctions seem illogical. If a person
sells a phonograph he must intend that the buyer use more than one record,
just as the seller of a dispenser intends that the dispensed items be replaced.
Furthermore, even if records are not bought for repair, the injunction prevents
all sales, not just those for repair purposes.
It must be pointed out that the Morgan case can be validly distinguished
if the Court were disposed to find that the patentee does not intend that non-
repair discs be bought, since in the Morgan case the Court found such intent
by implication. However, today, implied intent would not be useful, since if the
patentee wished to negative this consent to repair, by placing a notice on the
invention to the effect that only his elements could be used in repairing the
combination, he would certainly run afoul of the Clayton Act, by virtue of the
decision in the Motion Pictures case.
While this note has criticised the Victor case, it seems that the Court was
trying to reach a just result. The first Victor case, 213 U.S. 301 (1909), in-
dicates the reason for this result. Although the patentee had a good invention,
it would seem that the combination of a recording disc 'with a phonograph
would be obvious and not inventive. Actually, the patentee's invention was not
in the combination, but in the disc itself. Previous recording devices had em-
ployed a cylindrical recording method. Plaintiff's disc was a considerable
improvement. For some reason, however, the Patent Office refused to grant
a patent on the disc itself, and granted the patent on the combination. Thus,
the first Victor case went to a great deal of trouble to hold this very obvious
combination valid. This decision, combined with the second Victor decision, had
the effect of granting a patent for the disc itself which should have been re-
ceived in the first place. This paternalism not only brought about impossible
distinction between elements: the heart of the invention and the nonessential
elements, but also brought confusion to the law relating to the patentability of
combinations. These decisions paved the way for the A.B. Dick case. Even
today, the uncertainty brought about by these decisions, further confronted by
intervening decisions, persist in the law relating to the patentability of combina-
tions. Cf., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Leitch
Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of America v. Ameri-
can Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263
U.S. 100 (1923). See also Lincoln Eng'r Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp. 303
U.S. 545 (1938).
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a combination patent covers only the totality of elements, and not
any single element. 32 Thus, if the patent is for a combination of A
with B, the patent covers the entity AB and not A alone or B alone.
It seems illogical to say one element is more important when the
invention is an aggregate. One might as well say the nut is more
important than the bolt. In any event it is clear that there is no
legally recognized heart of a combination."3
In light of these criticisms of the Mercoid case Congress enacted
section 27134 which clearly established the tort of contributory in-
fringement.
Although in subsection (b) the offender is called an infringer, and
in subsection (c) he is called a contributory infringer, there appears
to be no substantial difference in the meaning of the terms. Section
271(c), the narrower of the two subsections, provides a remedy
against the supplier of an unpatented component of a patented com-
bination, who sells a material part of the invention, which is especially
adapted for use in infringing a patent, and not a staple article of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. Congress ap-
pears to have codified the principles of the earlier cases in section 271.
The courts will now be required to determine what is a material part
of an invention.
Section 271 (b) is broader than 271 (c), and is a catch-all section
designed to cover any conduct which the courts choose to characterize
as "actively inducing infringement."' 5
The courts have reached conflicting results in determining the effect
of these subsections, and the language of 271(d), on the rule of the
Mercoid case. At least two cases have held that these sections over-
ruled the decision in the Mercoid case,3 but another has held that
the act did not have such effect.3  Legislative history of the act is
silent on this subject. 8
32. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944).
33. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346
(1961).
34. Oppenheim, supra note 24, at 212.
35. See National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co. 274 F.2d 224 (6th
Cir. 1959) (advertising an element for use in a patented combination); Jones
v. Radio Corp. of America, 131 F. Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (the information
gleaned from inducing breach of a confidential relationship was used to make
infringement possible). See also Note, 66 Yale L. J. 132 (1956).
36. Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957); Sola Electric
Co. v. General Electric Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956). See also 25 U.
Cinc. L. Rev. 521 (1956); 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 280, 289 (1957).
37. I.D. Russell Co. v. Dr. Salisbury's Laboratories, 198 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.
1952). See Comments, 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 246 (1952); 41 Geo. L.J. 112
(1952); 28 Temp. L.Q. 148 (1954).
38. See, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patent Law Codification and
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In determining the statute's effect one must look to the status of
the law in the period after the Mercoid case. This requires an analysis
of the previously discussed cases.
C. TIE-IN SALES: REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT: ABUSE OF PATENTS
It has been indicated that the contributory infringement cases could
be grouped into three classes; (1) tie-ins, (2) repair and replacement,
and (3) abuse of patents.
1. Tie-Ins
The tie-in cases, such as A. B. Dick,3 9 are now of only historical
importance. They merit discussion, however, because they reflect the
attitudes of the courts of the pre-Clayton Act age, and clearly set out
a policy that is not the law today.
In Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co.,4 0 plaintiff, a seller of unpatented button fasteners, sought an
injunction to prevent defendant from selling button fasteners to
persons using a patented button fastening machine sold by the plain-
tiff. The patentee sold the button fastening machine on the condition
that the buyer use only button fasteners manufactured by the seller,
placing a notice upon the machine stating these conditions of sale.
The notice also stated that if competitive button fasteners were used
with the machine, the sale would be rescinded, and title to the machine
would revest in the patentee.
The court granted the injunction holding that the conditional sale
was valid, and therefore, that the buyer's unauthorized use of the
machine with competitive fasteners amounted to an infringement.
Defendant, in knowingly selling the button fasteners to the un-
authorized user of the machine, was guilty of aiding and abetting
infringement, and hence guilty of contributory infringement.
Henry v. A.B. Dick involved a fact situation substantially identical
to that in the Button Fastener case, except that there was no provision
for revesting title to the machine in the patentee. Plaintiff sold its
patented mimeograph with the following notice attached:
This machine is sold by the A.B. Dick Co., with the license
restriction that it may be used only with the stencil, paper, ink
and other supplies made by A.B. Dick Co.4 1
Review, Number 3, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st
Seas., ser. 9 (1951); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); S. Rep.
No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Comment, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1952);
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 51 (1954).
39. 224 U.S. 1 (1911).
40. 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
41. 224 U.S. at 11.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in
issuing an injunction against a seller of unpatented ink, preventing
him from knowingly selling ink to an owner of an A.B. Dick mimeo-
graph.
The Court interpreted the transactions as being in two parts; (1)
the sale of a chattel embodying the invention, and (2) a license to
use the chattel in accordance with the patent, the consideration for
the license being the buyer's promise to use the ink and other supplies
made by A.B. Dick.42 Further, the Court held that the right to prac-
tice the invention was severable from the ownership of the chattel
embodying the invention. Thus, a patentee, if he wished, could sell
his invention and withhold the right to use it in accordance with the
patent. Having the power to withhold the right to use the patent,
the patentee could condition that right on the buyer's using the
patentee's supplies, the greater power including the lesser.4 3 Since
the buyer breached the agreement by using a competitive ink, the
patentee could elect either to affirm the agreement or sue for patent
infringement in the federal courts.44
Defendant argued that the granting of an injunction would give
A.B. Dick a patent on the unpatented supplies used in connection with
the patented machine, and further, that the result was not intended
by the patent grant, which allows only a monopoly for inventions and
that the Sherman Act prohibits such a monoply.45
The Court, in a previous case,46 held that the Sherman Act did not
apply to patent licensing agreements and therefore dismissed this
argument in A.B. Dick. As to the monopoly over unpatented supplies,
the Court held that this was consistent with the purposes of the
patent grant. A.B. Dick, had it desired, could have kept its invention
secret. Then there would have been no market for the ink. The
policy of the patent law is to encourage disclosure of inventions. By
disclosing its invention, A.B. Dick created a market for the ink.47
Thus, in granting it this market, nothing has been taken away from
the public. Furthermore, in the absence of any contravening public
policy, the patent grant should be construed broadly to encourage
disclosure of inventions.
In addition, the Court pointed out that A.B. Dick was selling its
mimeographs at cost, seeking to profit from its invention through
the sale of supplies. This method of exploiting the invention was
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id at 16.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
47. 224 U.S. at 32.
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quite proper.4 8 The patentee could lawfully collect royalties in ac-
cordance with the amount of usage of the machine. Since such a
royalty system would involve costly accounting practices it would be
more convenient for A.B. Dick to collect its royalties by adding them
on the cost of supplies.4 9
The ultimate effect of the A.B. Dick case was to extend the paten-
tee's monopoly to unpatented goods used in connection with the
patented machine. This patent monopoly could be enforced against
a seller of unpatented supplies, just as if the Patent Office had issued
a patent covering the unpatented supplies.50
This anticompetitive situation was remedied by the Supreme
Court's application of section 3 of the Clayton Act. Thus, in Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,51 a case substantially
similar to A.B. Dick, the seller of a patented motion picture projector,
which was sold with a licensing restriction similar to that in A.B.
Dick, sought to enjoin defendant's breach of this restriction. De-
fendant used film other than that supplied by the plaintiff in violation
of the agreement. The lower court denied the injunction on the
ground that the licensing restriction violated section 3 of the Clayton
Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, but in
doing so did not hold that the Clayton Act was applicable. The Court
said, however, that section 3 was "a most persuasive expression of
the public policy of our country with respect to... [this] ... question
.... ,,52 Here, as in the A.B. Dick case, the patentee sold his machine
48. Id. at 31. Contra, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917).
49. The dissent in the A.B. Dick case is significant in that it agrees with
the majority. It concedes two main issues: (1) that a patent holder can restrict
the use of a patented invention if he sells it conditionally, and (2) that the
Sherman Act does not apply to this situation.
The dissent's position was that the licensing restriction should be interpreted
as creating a contract to the effect that the buyer of a mimeograph machine
must use A.B. Dick's supplies as consideration for the unconditional sale of the
invention. An unconditional sale is one where the buyer is entitled to the
unconditional use of the invention in accordance with the patent. Therefore, the
contract condition that only A.B. Dick's supplies be used, was collateral to
the sale, and could be remedied only by an action for damages in the state
court.
The dissent pointed out the anticompetitive effects of the decision, noting
that the majority decision gave the patentee a monopoly in the unpatented
supplies used in connection with the invention. 224 U.S. at 49 (dissenting
opinion).
50. Cf. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S.
325 (1909).
51. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
52. Id. at 517.
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at cost, seeking to derive his profits from the unpatented film.5A The
Court held that such extension of the patent monopoly to unpatented
goods is "wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly.", There-
fore, even if the owner of the projector and the supplier of film are
guilty of infringement and contributory infringement respectively, a
court of equity will deny the remedy of injunction because to grant
such a remedy would be inconsistent with the public policy expressed
in section 3 of the Clayton Act.
This policy as expressed in the Clayton Act is that a patentee should
not be allowed to extend his patent monopoly to unpatented goods
used in practicing his invention, even though it makes it inconvenient
for the patentee to exploit his invention, and there would have been
no market for these unpatented goods had the patentee not disclosed
his invention.
2. Repair v. Reconstruction
The typical repair case is illustrated by the following example: X,
the patentee, sells the patented combination AB to a buyer. Un-
patented component B wears out before component A. The buyer then
purchases component B for use in repairing the combination from
someone other than the patentee. X proceeds against the supplier of
component B on the theory that when the buyer of component B
combines it with the unworn component A, he is practicing the
patentee's invention without authority from X, and hence is an
infringer. The supplier of component B in knowingly aiding and
abetting the infringement is guilty of contributory infringement. On
the other hand, if the buyer purchased his repair component from
the patentee, he would be entitled to practice the invention, since the
courts would then say he has an implied license to do so.
As indicated above, in the Victor case55 the Supreme Court granted
an injunction for contributory infringement. One notes the similarity
in result between the Victor and A.B. Dick cases. The patentee, by
means of his patent, has obtained a monopoly on the unpatented com-
ponent used in repairing his invention. It might be expected that
after the passage of the Clayton Act, the Court would apply the
Motion Picture rationale to this type of case. However, the Court
has not found this necessary. The pre-Clayton Act and pre-A.B. Dick
decisions in the Morgan Envelope and Wilson cases reached the
analogous result with strikingly similar reasoning. Although the
53. Ibid. See also Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31 (1911).
54. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
517 (1917).




Court did not rest its holding in these cases on this point, it was made
abundantly clear that the injunction was denied because of the danger
to competition. 6 Apparently the court rested these decisions on a
theory of implied license, holding that a buyer of a patented article
had the right "to give duration to that which he owns, or has a right
to use . . .",' even though this means replacing or repairing an es-
sential element of the patented article. The buyer would be guilty of
infringement only if he built an entirely new combination. Thus,
when the question again reached the Supreme Court in Heyer v.
Duplicator Mfg. Co.,5 8 it needed only to cite these old decisions. Rather
than overrule the Victor case, the Court distinguished it in the manner
indicated above. Although tie-in cases are theoretically different than
repair cases, they both indicate that a patentee will not be permitted
to extend his patent monopoly to unpatented goods used in practicing
the invention by means of injunction for contributory infringement.
3. Abuse of Patents
The typical abuse of patents case is illustrated as follows: The
patent is granted for a combination of components AB. The patentee
does not practice the invention itself, but rather sells component B
to the buyer with an implied license to practice the invention. When
others combine component A with component B in accordance with
the patent, the patentee proceeds against the supplier of B, on the
theory that the person who combines component A with component B,
not purchased from the patentee, is guilty of infringement. Therefore,
the supplier of component B, who knowingly sells it to a person who
combines it with component A, is guilty of contributory infringement.
The Supreme Court has never granted an injunction for contributory
infringement on these or similar facts.5 9
It is believed that this situation is inharmonious with the tie-in
and repair cases. If the patentee can maintain an injunction he has
achieved a monopoly over the unpatented components. Therefore,
56. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); Wilson
v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
57. 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 123.
58. 263 U.S. 100 (1923).
59. This is somewhat surprising when one considers the fact that in the
tie-in and repair-construction cases, the patentee has sold something to the
purported infringer. Thus the argument that the patentee has had the op-
portunity to profit from his invention through the original sale, does not apply
to abuse of patents cases. In fact, one can envision circumstances, such as in
the I.D. Russell Co. v. Dr. Salisbury's Laboratories, 198 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.
1952), where the patentee could not exploit his invention except by sales of the
unpatented component. But, the Court has found that the interest in preserving
competition overbalances the injury to the patentee in the individual case.
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it is not surprising that the Court has used the rationale of the
Motion Picture case to deny an injunction for contributory infringe-
ment.
Thus the Carbice and Leitch cases stand for the same proposition
as the cases discussed above, that is-a patentee will not be granted
an injunction for contributory infringement in order to extend his
patent monopoly to unpatented goods used in practicing the invention.
It has been indicated above that the Mercoid case differed from
these cases only in the respect that the unpatented component was
especially adapted for practicing the patentee's invention. This
difference should be significant only in demonstrating defendant's
intent and knowledge. Therefore the Supreme Court was justified in
disregarding this fact, and quite properly only inquired into plaintiff's
conduct.
All the tie-in, repair, and abuse of patent cases discussed above
have one thing in common: the suit to prevent infringement was
brought by a patentee-seller of an unpatented commodity used in
practicing his invention against another seller of that unpatented
commodity. In these cases the Court felt that it would be inequitable
to grant the patentee an injunction. In denying equitable relief,
where a legal right exists, the Court is necessarily holding that the
plaintiff is guilty of inequitable conduct even though there was no
showing that plaintiff had any specific intent to monopolize or engage
in any other conscious inequitable conduct. The Court must then be
holding that successful suit by the seller of an unpatented commodity
has the necessary effect of leading to an improper extension of the
patent monopoly.
It is submitted that the status of the law after the Mercoid case
may be summarized as follows: (1) a court of equity will deny an
injunction for contributory infringement to a seller of an unpatented
commodity; and (2) the courts will not question the nature of the
defendant's conduct unless the patentee can show that he is entitled
to equitable relief.
If the above statement represents the law after the Mercoid case,
the language of section 271 is sufficiently broad to support a con-
struction in accordance with it. Subsection 271(d) does not require
a contrary result. This subsection merely requires that relief not be
denied merely because the patentee seeks to exploit his patent. Specifi-
cally, the subsection permits proper application of contributory in-
fringement, such as that used as an example in the introduction to
this note.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,00 was the first
60. 365 U.S. 336 (1961), reversing 270 F.2d 200 (lst Cir. 1960).
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case to be decided in the Supreme Court after the passage of section
271, in which that section was construed. Plaintiff, who owned a
combination patent on a fabric top and metal frame for use on
convertible automobiles', was in the business of selling fabric tops.
Although the metal frame normally lasted for the life of the car,
the fabric top needed replacement from time to time, and when
defendant attempted to supply replacement fabric tops to car owners,
plaintiff instituted this suit to enjoin such sales. The court of appeals,
in affirming the district court's decision to let the injunction issue,
reasoned that since the fabric top was a material part of the invention,
the car owner was performing an unpermitted reconstruction in
replacing the top since "the life of the fabric is not so short, nor is
the fabric so cheap, that we can safely assume that an owner would
rationally believe that in replacing it he was making only a minor
repair to his top structure."' 6' Therefore, the defendant, in supplying
the car owner with the tops, was aiding in the unpermitted recon-
struction and was thus a contributory infringer.
In the Supreme Court, the Justice Department argued as amicus
curiae, contending that the repair-reconstruction cases, the tie-in
cases, and the abuse of patents cases, should be governed by the
principles of the antitrust laws.62 More particularly, the government
argued that contributory infringement is a derivative tort, and
therefore, the supplier of fabric tops cannot be a contributory in-
fringer unless the person who actually buys the fabric and repairs
his top, is an infringer.6 3 Therefore, the Court should decide the
case under 271 (a), which is declarative of the prior law and not
affected by 271 (b), (c) and (d) .64 The principle governing this case
should be the same as that of the Motion Pictures, Carbice and
Mercoid cases.
In these and other cases, this Court has held that the patentee's
monopoly is restricted to exclusion of others from manufacture,
sale and use of the patented invention itself, and that it does not
embrace monopolization of unpatented material used in, or neces-
sary to the use of, the patented invention.65
As to the cases specifically dealing with repair or replacement,
referring to the Wilson, Morgan Envelope, and Heyer Duplicator
cases, the government's position was that, "they, too, evidence an
61. 270 F.2d at 205.
62. Brief for Amicus Curiae, p. 9, Aro Mfg. Co., v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
63. Id. at 7.
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 3. (Emphasis added.)
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indisposition to extend the patent monopoly beyond the terms of the
grant."66
If the grant of a combination patent confers upon the patentee
power to excercise dominion over replacement of a worn-out,
unpatented part of the combination-a replacement which is
necessary if the patented machine or combination is to remain
operative and perform the function for which it was purchased-
the patentee would be given the same kind of partial monopoly
over unpatented materials held not to be within the legitimate
scope of the patent monopoly in Motion Pictures Patents and
Carbice.67
As to the argument that the fabric is the heart of the invention,
the government contended that "the basic fallacy . . . is that it rests
on according one element of the patented combination a role, with
respect to reconstruction, distinct from (and presumably higher than)
the other elements." 6 In any event, the Mercoid case held that there
is no heart of a combination.
In reversing the court of appeals, the majority of the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Whittaker, adopted the government's
position in most instances. However, the Court did not apply the
principles of the Mercoid, Carbice, and Motion Pictures cases. As in
the Heyer Duplicator case, the Court simply relied on the old prece-
dents in the Morgan Envelope and Wilson cases. The Court cited with
approval the following language from Wilson v. Simpson:
[A]lthough there is no right to 'rebuild' a patented combina-
tion, the entity 'exists' notwithstanding the fact that destruction
or impairment of one of its elements render it inoperable; and
that, accordingly, replacement of that worn-out essential part is
permissible restoration of the machine to the original use for
which it was bought. . . [I]t is 'the use of the whole' of the
combination which a purchaser buys, and that repair or replace-
ment of the worn-out, damaged or destroyed part is but an
exercise of the right 'to give duration to that which he owns, or
has a right to use as a whole.'6 9
According to the Court, the "distilled essence" of the Wilson case
was stated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America: "The (patent) monopolist cannot prevent those to whom
he sells from ...reconditioning articles worn by use, unless, they
in fact make a new article. ' '1 ° The Court then held that to replace
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-43
(1961).
70. 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the fabric top in a combination of a fabric top and a frame was a
permitted repair.7 1
The dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan and the concurring opinion
of Justice Brennan agreed that because of the derivative nature of
the tort of contributory infringement, the combiner's conduct should
be examined under 271 (a). However, they indicated that the stand-
ards in 271 (c) should be read into 271 (a). They felt that repair or
replacement were questions of fact, which should be decided in each
individual case.72
Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, 73 disagreed with these con-
tentions, because he felt that an individual case analysis would lead to
unpredictable results, and therefore, the small business man would
have no way of determining in advance whether or not his sales of
unpatented goods constituted contributory infringement.
While the Court in the Aro case did not adopt the analysis suggested
in this note or that suggested by the Government, they did reach
exactly the same result. The case holds that any replacement of a
worn element of a combination is not infringement. However, the
case indicates the disposition of the Court to treat the repair-replace-
ment cases differently than the abuse of patent cases. Hence, the full
effect of section 271 can not be determined until another Mercoid
case reaches the Supreme Court.
71. 365 U.S. at 346. With regard to the "heart" of the invention argument
the Court held that there is no "legally recognizable or protected 'essential'
element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the invention in a combination patent." Ibid. Query:
What does this do to the requirement of subsection 271(c) that the article be
a "material element"?
72. Id. at 376. If these Justices mean that subsections 271(b), (c), and
(d) should be read into subsection (a), they have the most logical arguments.
If, in all cases of contributory infringement, it would be necessary to judge the
combiner's conduct under 271(a) without reading in these subsections, it
would amount to a judicial repeal of these subsections.
73. Id. at 346. In his concurring opinion Justice Black touches on what seems
to be the heart of the problem. Although the validity of the patent was not in
issue, he questioned the novelty in combining a fabric top with a metal frame.
This knowledge has been available since the days of the "surrey with the fringe
on top."
It appears that Justice Black is correct. The invention if there was any
patentable invention at all, would seem to be in the fabric top, which had an
advantageous feature in preventing the top from leaking. Apparently, the
Patent Office did not allow a claim on this. This would explain the patentee's
argument that the fabric is the "heart" of the invention. Cf. the dissenting
opinion of Justice Jackson in the Mercoid case, 320 U.S. 661, 679 (1944).
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D. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the effect of the Aro case and future Supreme
Court decisions will be as follows:
(1) A court will not enjoin the sale of an unpatented commodity
used in practicing a patented invention, if the plaintiff (patentee) is
also a seller of that unpatented commodity.
(2) As a corollary to this, a court will grant equitable relief only
to the patentee who practices the invention himself or licenses others
to practice the invention.
(3) A court of equity will not look into the defendant's conduct
unless the patentee shows he is not a seller of the unpatented com-
modity, sale of which is sought to be enjoined, and he is otherwise
entitled to equitable relief.
(4) Sections 271 (b), (c) and (d) will be held declarative of the
prior law.74
74. A similar analysis would be applicable to cases involving a suit for
injunction for direct infringement. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942). This note has dealt with the subject on the question of
remedy, coming to the conclusion that the equitable remedy of injunction would
be denied. This leaves open a possibility of an action at law for damages. First,
it must be indicated that such a remedy is of little value, since it would not
be feasible to ferret out and bring suit against all infringers. In the Aro case
monetary damages were awarded in the lower court, and by holding the
patent uninfringed, the Court denied this remedy also. Justice Roberts, in the
Mercoid case indicated that there would be no infringement in an abuse of
patents situation.
It is submitted, however, that to say that the patent is uninfringed under
these circumstances, unnecessarily complicates the matter. To illustrate this,
if a person who had no dealings with the patentee in the Aro case, combined a
fabric top with a frame, in accordance with the patent, he would be an infringer.
Yet, under the circumstances of the Aro case, the same conduct was held not to
constitute infringement. Thus, to say that under some circumstances combining
a frame with a fabric top is infringement, while under other circumstances it
is not, is an absurdity.
However, if the antitrust analysis suggested in this note were to be adopted,
a recovery for damages would theoretically be allowable. But, because suit by
the seller of an unpatented element of a combination is inconsistent with the
purpose of the antitrust laws, loss of profits on the loss of sales of that un-
patented element, would not be an item recoverable in damages.
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